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1. Introduction
Recent news regarding the two largest social networking sites in
the United States, MySpace1 and Facebook,2 documents how these
websites are beginning to respond to complaints and pressure from
state Attorneys General, legislators, and concerned parents about not
doing enough to protect their users, especially minors, from sexual
predators.' While it is a violation of the terms of service of both
J.D. Candidate, 2009 U.C. Hastings College of the Law
1. MySpace Home Page, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
2. Facebook Home Page, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
3. See Mario F. Cattabiani, MySpace will help ward off predators, THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 15, 2008, at Al; Phil Helsel, Under Mounting Pressure
MySpace to Improve Safety, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Jan. 15, 2008, at Al; Anne
Barnard, Barriers are increased for users of MySpace, THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 2008, § Finance, at 11; Chris Iven & Gina Chen, Cuomo, Facebook
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MySpace4 and Facebook5 to post pornographic images or videos and
to solicit minors, investigators have found, not surprisingly, that these
activities are prevalent on social networking sites. 6 Many social
network users are minors; Facebook and MySpace have set the
minimum age for users at 13' and 14" respectively. The growing
number of children using social networks poses several legal and
moral issues regarding what obligations and duties social networking
sites have to their users.
State Attorneys General offices have reached separate
agreements with MySpace and Facebook regarding the
implementation of security measures. The Facebook agreement,
made on October 16, 2007, provides that Facebook will: (1) accept
complaints about harassment, pornography, and other abuses of the
terms of service to abuse@facebook.com; (2) respond to and
investigate complaints within 24 hours; and (3) have an independent
examiner provide reports to the public and the Attorney General's
office about the complaint review process.9 On January 14, 2008,
MySpace agreed to: (1) create a high school section for minors; (2)
make the default setting for those under 18 'private'; (3) address
complaints about abusive and inappropriate content within 72 hours;
(4) create software to find underage users; and (5) allow parents to
submit their children's email to prevent profiles from being created
with those email addresses. ' The MySpace agreement goes further
than the Facebook agreement to address the concerns of parents and
law enforcement officials, but neither is an end-all solution to the
problems of cyber-bullying, harassment, and other inappropriate and
predatory behaviors that exist on social networks.1'
The blossoming of self-regulation on the part of Facebook and
MySpace is due to increasingly intense negative media scrutiny and
Reach Deal, THE POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Oct. 17, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Iven &
Chen]; David Ho, With pressure on, Facebook agrees to improve security, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Oct. 17, 2007, at 3.
4. MySpace Terms & Conditions, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=
misc.terms (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
5. Facebook Terms of Use, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Nov.
15, 2007).
6. Joseph Spector, Cuomo launches sex predator probe of Facebook, THE JOURNAL
NEWS (Westchester County, New York), Sept. 25, 2007, at lB.
7. Facebook Terms of Use, supra note 5.
8. MySpace Terms & Conditions, supra note 4.
9. See Iven & Chen, supra note 3, at Al; Ho, supra note 3, at 3.
10. Cattabiani, supra note 3, at Al; see also Barnard, supra note 3, at 11.
11. Op-Ed., MySpace steps up for Kids, THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston, SC),
Feb. 3, 2008, at A10; see also Barnard, supra note 3, at 11.
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threats of prosecution by state Attorneys General. Facebook was
threatened with prosecution under the Consumer Product Warranties
Act 2 for making false representations regarding the safety of the
website. 3 Using the Consumer Product Warranties Act to force
Facebook to self-regulate demonstrates how difficult it has been to
implement a meaningful regulatory scheme on social networks and
the Internet at large.
II. Social Networking Sites
A. Brief History
The first social networking websites began in the mid-1990s.
14
Social networks are generally characterized by allowing users to
create a profile to tell other users about themselves, create friend
lists, and by having a public forum for groups to communicate with
one other. Some social networks have clearly defined purposes (e.g.,
reconnecting with former classmates,'5 or common interest groups). 6
Such networks are usually more limited in size, depending on how
many people are interested in the subject matter and how useful the
social network is to its users.
17
Other social networks, especially newer social networks, have
broadened their purpose, and, as a consequence, have larger
memberships. Examples of these broader purposes include video
sharing," photo sharing,'9 news article sharing," and blogging.2' The
12. Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2008).
13. Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, N.Y. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo
and Facebook Announce New Model to Protect Children Online, US STATES NEWS, Oct.
16, 2007.
14. David Randall & Victoria Richards, Facebook can ruin your life. And so can
MySpace, Bebo..., THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-can-ruin-your-
life-and-so-can-myspace-bebo-780521.html.
15. See, e.g., Classmates.com Home Page, http://www.classmates.com (last visited
Mar. 21, 2008); ConnectU Home Page, http://www.connectu.com (last visited Mar. 21,
2008).
16. For example, social networks have been created around sports, recreation,
hobbies, etc.
17. Compare Yahoo! Groups boxer lovers, http://groups.yahoo.com/ (Search Yahoo!
Groups for "boxerlovers") (last visited Aug. 31, 2008) (indicating 3,944 members for a
group of Boxer dog fans), with Mark Zuckerberg, Our First 100 Million, THE FACEBOOK
BLOG, Aug. 26, 2008, available at http://blog.new.facebook.com/blog.php?
post=28111272130 (last visited Sept. 21, 2008) (stating Facebook has reached 100 million
users world wide).
18. E.g., YouTube Home Page, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
19. E.g., Flickr Home Page, http://www.flickr.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008); Picasa
Home Page, http://www.picasa.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
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two largest and perhaps most well known social networks are
MySpace and Facebook. MySpace has over 70 million22 active users
and Facebook has more than 64 million' active users.24 Both MySpace
and Facebook allow users to reconnect with or make new friends
online. Communication with a person's social network on these
websites can be made through pictures, videos, emails, posting group
bulletins, posting public comments on user profiles, public journals,
and many other ways.
While MySpace and Facebook are not the only social networks
that allow such a broad range of communication, they are certainly
among the most well-known and successful ones in the United
States.25 The proliferation of social networks has grown so much that
one website, www.wink.com, is designed to allow its users to search
for friend profiles across various social networks and manage their
own profiles in one location.26 While beyond the scope of this article,
it is important to note that some social networking companies are
international, so regulation of foreign based companies and U.S.
based social networking companies that operate international
versions of their website may face additional issues of international
law.
7
B. What Dangers Do Social Networking Sites Pose?
The problems of sexual predation, solicitation, cyber-bullying,
and exposure to unwanted pornographic materials are obviously not
20. E.g., Digg Home Page, http://www.digg.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
21. E.g., LiveJournal Home Page, http://www.livejournal.com (last visited Mar. 21,
2008). "Blog" is a now a common term which began as a contraction of the words web-
log.
22. MySpace Outperforms All Other Social Networking Sites, BUSINESS WIRE, July
12, 2007 [hereinafter MySpace Outperforms].
23. Press Release, Facebook, Statistics, available at http://www.facebook.com/press/
info.php?statistics (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
24. An active user is calculated as the number of unique visitors who login to the
website during one month. MySpace Outperforms, supra note 22.
25. For other prominent social networking websites see Bebo Home Page,
http://www.bebo.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008); Yahoo! 360 Home Page,
http://360.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008); Friendster Home Page,
http://www.friendster.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008); Orkut Home Page,
http://www.orkut.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008); Windows Live Spaces Home Page,
http://home.services.spaces.live.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
26. Wink, About Wink, http://wink.com/wink/about (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
In the spirit of full disclosure, the author of this article has worked for Wink.com prior to
its current incarnation as a social network search engine.
27. James C. Anderson, Online Child Exploitation Cases, WYO. LAWYER, Aug. 2007,
at 24.
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limited to minor users. Due to their vulnerability, however, minors
are provided special protections.' The leading research on the online
dangers faced by minors was carried out by the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children ("NCMEC").29
1. A Profile of Victimized Children
The children who are sexually exploited in online encounters
range from those who come from poor, broken, or abusive homes, to
children who come from stable or affluent homes that have never
been abused before.3° No particular 'type' of child is immune from
online dangers. According to research conducted by NCMEC, sixty-
one percent of children ages 13 to 17 have personal profiles on social-
networking sites.3 While many social networks have minimum age
requirements as part of their terms of service, many children lie about
their age in order to use popular social networks.32 One in five minors
who use the Internet are subjected to unwanted sexual solicitation
over the course of a year; of those incidents, twenty-seven percent
involve requests for the children to give nude pictures of themselves.3
Of all cases of online sexual solicitation, one in four involves children
under the age of 14.34
Not all the statistics are disheartening, a survey conducted in
2006 found that compared to 2000, fewer children are being sexually
solicited.35 Also, a study conducted by Internet Solutions for Kids in
California and the University of New Hampshire found that of the
fifteen percent of children who reported online sexual solicitation,
28. Jessica S. Groppe, Comment, A Child's Playground or a Predator's Hunting
Ground?-How to Protect Children on Internet Social Networking Sites, 16 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 215, 218 (2007).
29. See National Center for Missing & Exploited Children,
http://www.missingkids.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2008); JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY
MITCHELL & DAVID FINKELHOR, NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED
CHILDREN, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER (2006) [hereinafter
FIVE YEARS LATER].
30. Anderson, supra note 27, at 24.
31. Elizabeth P. Stedman, Comment, MySpace, But Whose Responsibility? Liability
of Social-Networking Websites When Offline Sexual Assaults of Minors Follows Online
Interaction, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 363,369 n.36 (2007).
32. Stedman, supra note 31, at 370 n.43 (stating that in order to appear older and beat
the age restriction many children type in their age as 99); See also Helsel, supra note 3, at
Al.
33. Anderson, supra note 27, at 22; See also FIVE YEARS LATER, supra note 29.
34. Stedman, supra note 31, at 374.
35. Id. at 372 n.58.
178 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. [31:1
only four percent were using social networking sites.36 While these
statistics may be a good sign that online activity in general and social
networks in particular are safer for minors now than in the past, it by
no means indicates that sexual predators on social networks are not a
continuing concern.
2. A Profile of Sexual Predators
Similar to the victims of sexual predation, the perpetrators
cannot be easily or neatly categorized. 7 Among the population of
sexual predators there are, males and females, minors and adults.3" In
cases where children under the age of 14 are solicited online, half the
perpetrators are juveniles, a quarter of the perpetrators are adults,
and victims of the remaining quarter of perpetrators were not sure of
the age of their solicitor.39 Where the gender of the perpetrator was
known to the victim, males committed sixty-seven percent and
females committed nineteen percent of online sexual solicitations of
minors.40 NCMEC research suggests that at any particular hour there
41are around 50,000 sexual predators online surfing the Internet.
C. The Issue of Over Sharing
NCMEC research indicates that thirty-four percent of minors
who use the Internet have posted their real names, schools in which
they attend, phone numbers, and/or home addresses in public areas
online.42 Social networks can lull their users into a false sense of
security which can lead to over sharing personal information. Possible
reasons for this false sense of security include: (1) users are mistaken
about the public nature of what they are posting or to what extent
strangers may view what they or their friends have posted, (2) users
incorrectly believe that their actions online are divorced from the
'real world,' and/or (3) a belief that because other users are posting
similar information, sharing personal or otherwise private
information is the norm in the online social community.43 Whatever
36. Ursula Heger, MySpace safer than chatting, COURIER MAIL (Australia), Feb. 7,
2008, at 20. See also Kids safer in MySpace, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney, Australia), Feb.
6,2008, at 11.
37. Groppe, supra note 28, at 216.
38. Id.
39. Stedman, supra note 31, at 374 n.70.
40. Id. at 374 n.71.
41. Id. at 373 n.64.
42. Anderson, supra note 27, at 22.
43. For example, there are numerous news articles documenting the recent
phenomena of user profiles being shown in court as evidence, local police using
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the reasons for the phenomenon of 'over sharing' are in online social
networks there is real danger in posting personal and contact
information online. Information such as addresses, and school and
work schedules can obviously be used by sexual predators. But, even
seemingly innocuous blog postings about having a bad week or the
'about me' section of a profile can provide insights to predators on
who might be vulnerable to persuasion. Realizing the dangers online
social networking presents, both state and federal governments have
made several attempts to regulate social networks to protect users,
especially minors."
III. Attempts to Regulate Social Networking Sites
Various attempts, through both tort law and legislation, have
been made to regulate social networking sites to prevent sexual
predators from using social networks as hunting grounds.
Unfortunately, these solutions have run into several roadblocks,
including First Amendment freedom of speech concerns and legal
immunity.45 The following sections will examine the nature and scope
of various legal theories for imposing liability on social networks and
will discuss three major cases (Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,6 Doe v.
SexSearch.com,"7 and Zeran v. America Online Incorporated8) which
deal with the issue of immunity.
A. Tort Liability: Court Finds No Duty
In June of 2006, MySpace was sued in Texas by a 14 year old girl
(Julie Roe) and her mother, because the girl had been sexually
assaulted by a 19 year old man, whom she had first met on MySpace.
The plaintiff in MySpace49 alleged that MySpace was negligent and
grossly negligent for not implementing safety measures to protect her
from sexual predators. The case was dismissed based on: (1) the
general tort principle of no duty for the criminal acts of others and (2)
information and pictures posted online to uncover crimes (e.g., drug use, etc.), schools
disciplining students for cyber-bullying and inappropriate postings, and potential
employers examining interviewees' online profiles. See e.g., Christi Cassel, Note, Keep Out
Of MySpace: Protecting Students From Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsion, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 644 (2007).
44. See generally Roxanne E. Christ et al., Social Networking Sites: To Monitor Or
Note To Monitor Users And Their Content?, 19 No. 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13
(2007).
45. See infra notes 46-113 and accompanying text.
46. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
47. Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F.Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
48. Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
49. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
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immunity under the Communications Decency Act." The court held
that MySpace could not be held liable for claims arising out of the
communications made by its users, nor could it be required to create
age verification procedures."
Regarding the issue of tort liability, the court in MySpace stated
that one exception to the general rule that there is no duty to protect
another from the criminal acts of a third party is where a special
relationship exists. 2 Special relationships, like employer-employee
and parent-child relationships, may impose a duty on one party to
control the actions of another. 3 The owner-guest relationship can
impose a duty on owners to protect guests against foreseeable third
party criminal acts which occur on their premises.-4 MySpace rejected
these theories of liability because the relationship between MySpace
and its users does not constitute a special relationship.55 Furthermore,
the court noted that a finding of an affirmative duty would "stop
MySpace's business in its tracks."56 Although MySpace is being
appealed and several new lawsuits have been filed against MySpace,57
litigants' attempt to regulate social networking sites through general
tort law has been unsuccessful. Furthermore, given the immunity
granted to social networking sites under the Communications
Decency Act, regulation of these sites via tort law will not likely
succeed in the future.
B. Communications Decency Act
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), passed in 1996, was
created to promote free speech on the Internet and the development
of the Internet and interactive media.58 While the CDA does not
require interactive service providers to self-regulate against obscenity
and other inappropriate behavior, it attempts to promote self-
50. Id. at 850 ("As a general rule, a person has no legal duty to protect another from
the criminal acts of a third person or control the conduct of another.") (quoting Walker v.
Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996)).
51. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
52. Id. at 850 (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525
(Tex. 1996)).
53. Id. at 850.
54. Micheal D. Marin & Christopher V. Popov, Doe v. MySpace, Inc.: Liability For
Third Party Content On Social Networking Sites, 25 COMM. LAW. 3, 5 (2007) [hereinafter
Marin].
55. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 851 ("the Court is unconvinced that any exception to
the general no duty rule applies to MySpace here").
56. Id. at 851.
57. See Marin, supra note 54, at 3 n.2.
58. Christ, supra note 44, at 13 n.5.
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regulation by granting immunity for removing user created content
and for the ineffectiveness of such regulation. 9
Specifically, the CDA states "No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider."'  Case law interpreting this section of the CDA held
almost unanimously that it provided immunity from liability for third
party content, until an April 3, 2008, Ninth Circuit case6" held that
only a limited immunity applied.62 SexSearch.com,63 decided on
August 22, 2007, is an important development to the progression of
the law in this area because it found a broad immunity from liability
for third party content and did not follow the Ninth Circuit's lead."
In SexSearch.com, John Doe, an adult user of SexSearch.com,
used the website to contact Jane Roe.6" Jane Roe, a 14 year old,
represented herself on the website as being eighteen years old."' After
chatting online for a while, the two decided to meet on November 15,
2005, in order to have a sexual encounter.67 John Doe was
subsequently arrested and charged with engaging in unlawful sexual
conduct with a minor.68 John Doe alleged fourteen different claims
against SexSearch.com and others which the court summarized as
"(a) Defendants failed to discover Jane Roe lied about her age to join
the website, or (b) the contract terms are unconscionable. '"6 9 In
granting the defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)," the district court found that CDA section
230(c)(1) applies to SexSearch.com7" and provides immunity from
59. Id. at 13-14.
60. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (2001).
61. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the creation of a mandatory questionnaire and standardized answers by
Roommates.com, is discriminatory and unlawful under the Fair Housing Act and there is
no protection under the CDA immunity because Roommates.com was the 'information
content provider').
62. Jon Burns, Recent Development, Doe v. SexSearch.com: Placing Real-Life
Liability Back Where It Belongs in a Virtual World, 9 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 69, 71 (2007).
63. Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
64. Burns, supra note 62, at 72.




69. Id. at 723-24.
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ("failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted").
71. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 728, 724 (The court on page 724 laid out the
test to determine the applicability of the CDA: "(1) SexSearch is a 'provider of an
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liability for third party content, in this case, the misrepresentation of
Jane Roe's age.
So far, the application of the CDA to social networking websites
has only been directly addressed in MySpace.73 The parties in
MySpace did not contest that MySpace qualifies as an 'interactive
computer service' and the court stated: "it is clear that MySpace
meets the statutory definition of such a service." 74 The major issue for
the court was the applicability and extent of the immunity given by
the CDA;75 this is likely to be the central issue for social networks in
future litigation as well. The plaintiffs argued that because their
claims were based on MySpace's failure to create safety measures for
minors, knowing sexual predators use their service, and not upon
postings of third-party content, that CDA immunity does not apply.76
The MySpace court rejected the plaintiff's argument to limit the
scope and applicability of CDA immunity by analogizing the case to
Zeran v. America Online Incorporated77 and concluding that "this
artful pleading... [is] disingenuous., 78 The court held that despite the
plaintiff's argument that their claims against MySpace were not
against MySpace as a publisher, but for failing to create safety
measures, that CDA immunity applied.79 Pleading around the CDA
immunity in this manner was "disingenuous" because the underlying
basis of the claim was that the plaintiff would not have been sexually
assaulted had MySpace prevented the communication between John
Doe and Julie Roe which set up their real world encounter.80 The
court concluded that the plaintiff's claims were against MySpace in its
role as a publisher, thus CDA immunity applied. 8' Regarding the
scope of the CDA immunity, the MySpace court cited Zeran, where
interactive computer service'; (2) the claim is based on 'information provided by another
information content provider'; and (3) the claim would treat SexSearch 'as publisher or
speaker' of that information").
72. Id. at 728.
73. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843,846-50 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
74. Id. at 846 (referring to 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) ("The term 'interactive computer
service' means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.")).
75. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49.
76. Id. at 848.
77. Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of
claims after concluding that CDA immunity applied).
78. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
79. Id. at 849.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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the Fourth Circuit held that CDA immunity applies even when the
interactive computer service has notice of the alleged false or
defamatory posting and fails to act because allowing liability "would
defeat the dual purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA."' The dual
purposes to which the Zeran court referred to were: (1) protecting the
Internet as a forum for communication with government regulation
kept to a minimum and (2) encouraging self-regulation of offensive
materials by interactive computer services.83 MySpace did not lose its
immunity by virtue of having notice that sexual predators are using
their service to prey on minors."' Given state of current case law, it
seems clear that social networks are shielded from liability, but
Congress has attempted to create other regulations, like the Child
Online Protection Act, to deal with sexual predators and
pornography on the Internet.
C. Child Online Protection Act
The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) was passed in 1998.85
COPA was designed to ensure that minors are not exposed to
pornographic material, 6 and provides an example of the First
Amendment freedom of speech challenges such legislation faces.87 In
2002, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded' a district court
ruling which found COPA to facially violate the First Amendment.
The district court opinion in ACLU v. Gonzales8" issued a permanent
injunction against enforcing COPA and found that while protecting
children from sexually explicit material on the Internet is a
compelling governmental interest that the means chosen was not
narrowly tailored.'
COPA was passed in response to the Supreme Court ruling in
Reno v. ACLU,91 which found that section 223 of the Communications
Decency Act of 199692 violates the First Amendment by being
82. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 330-31.
84. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
85. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2001).
86. Id.
87. See infra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
88. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
89. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F.Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
90. Id. at 777.
91. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
92. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996) (whose purpose was to protect minors from pornographic
material online).
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unconstitutionally overbroad. 3 However, COPA suffered from the
same constitutional defects. COPA states:
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the
material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World
Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes
that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is
harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000,
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.94
The "harmful to minors" standard was defined using the Miller
obscenity factors.9 COPA provided affirmative defenses for providers
of such information when those providers restricted minors from their
content by one of several age verification measures.96 The court in
Gonzales made two key factual findings based on expert testimony:
(1) available filtering tools are ninety-five percent effective in
blocking sexually explicit material9 and (2) "there is no evidence of
age verification services ... that actually reliably establish or verify
the age of Internet users., 98 Taken together both Reno and Gonzales
establish that Internet filtering tools are a "more effective and less
restrictive form of regulation." 99
When applied to social networks, given the availability of
pornography and sexually explicit material which state investigators
found,"° the analysis of Reno and Gonzales seems analogous; which
makes it likely that any future legislated age verification regulations
on social networks could not be constitutionally enforced.' °'
D. Deleting Online Predators Act
The most recent Congressional attempt to protect children from
sexual predators and sexual explicit material on social networks is the
pending Deleting Online Predators Act of 2007 ("DOPA"). 1° DOPA
is an example of indirect regulation, because it does not place
93. Gonzales, 478 F.Supp. 2d at 779.
94. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2001).
95. Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (The Miller factors for determining obscenity
are: (1) the average person applying contemporary community standards finds that the
material appeals to the prurient interest, (2) the material is patently offensive, and (3) the
material as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.).
96. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(c) (2001).
97. Gonzales, 478 F.Supp. 2d at 795.
98. Id. at 800.
99. Marin, supra note 54, at 7-8.
100. Spector, supra note 6, at lB.
101. Marin, supra note 55, at 8. See also Christ, supra note 44, at 15.
102. H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. (2007). See also S. 49, 110th Cong. Title 11 (2007).
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requirements on the owners and operators of social networks.
DOPA, if passed, would amend the Communications Act of 193403 to
require public schools and libraries to ban minors from using
commercial social networking sites and chat rooms without adult
supervision."'4 Currently, the House of Representatives version of
DOPA, which was introduced on February 16, 2007, has been
referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.' 5 An
identical version of DOPA was introduced in the Senate on January
4, 2007, as part of the Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act;
that bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation.' °6
DOPA faces serious challenges to its enactment, including
opposition by the American Library Association ("ALA") and other
similar groups. Beth Yoke, the Executive Director of the Young
Adult Library Services Association, a group associatcd with the
ALA, testified in the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and the Internet in opposition to DOPA.1°7 Arguing that DOPA
would be inefficacious, Ms. Yoke stated:
Youth librarians believe, and more importantly know from
experience, that education about safe Internet practices - for both
youth and parents - is the best way to protect young people. We
believe that the overly broad technological controls that would be
required under DOPA are often ineffective given the fast-moving
nature of modern technology9
Indeed, despite its provocative name, the Deleting Online
Predators Act does nothing to stop predators on social networks,
instead it attempts to restrict Internet usage by children."M
Presumably, minors who have Internet access at home would just
access their social networking accounts when not at school or in a
library.
103. 47 U.S.C. §254 (2001).
104. H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. § 3 (a)-(b) (2007).
105. H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. (2007).
106. S. 49, 100th Cong. Title 11 (2007).
107. Lindsay M. Gehman, Note & Comment, Deleting Online Predators Act:
"I Thought It Was My-Space"-How Proposed Federal Regulation of Commercial Social
Networking Sites Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech of Minors, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 155, 159 (2007) (citing Beth Yoke, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm.
and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, at 1, available at
http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/ woissues/techinttele/DOPAtestimony.pdf).
108. Id.
109. H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. (2007).
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The fact that DOPA, in its current incarnation, is over broad and
vague as to some of its key terms means it is likely to face First
Amendment constitutional challenges."' DOPA would require public
schools and libraries to "Protect against access [by minors] through
such computers to visual depictions that are-obscene; child
pornography; or harmful to minors... ."" The "harmful to minors"
standard, not specifically defined by the act, parallels the language of
COPA." 2 The Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction on
COPA on the grounds that the "harmful to minors" standard is
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. and would likely apply the
same reasoning with respect to DOPA. Furthermore, DOPA does
not define the terms "social networking website" or "chat room"-
the type of websites DOPA would prevent minors from accessing
while at public schools or libraries-and instead directs the Federal
Communications Commission to define those terms within 120 days
of the enactment of DOPA."4 The lack of carefully defined
operational terms poses serious questions as to whether DOPA could
be constitutionally enforced."'
E. Other Legislative Proposals
Recently, because of growing public concern regarding sexual
predators and safety on social networking sites, as well as inadequate
federal regulations, state Attorneys General offices and legislatures
have been getting involved. As the discussion in the introduction
section of this article illustrated, state Attorneys General are
approaching the situation with novel solutions. Instead of trying to
regulate social networking sites directly, states are using indirect
means to get social networking sites to self-regulate 116 and several
states have created proposals to ban convicted sexual predators from
using social networks.'
7
110. See Gehman, supra note 107, at 161-62 ("If the Supreme Court were to accept this
case, it would likely determine that this interference is an unconstitutional abridgment of
the right to free speech under the First Amendment.").
111. H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007).
112. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2008).
113. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,673 (2004).
114. H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. § 3(c) (2007).
115. For a more in depth analysis of the First Amendment with respect to DOPA see
Gehman, supra note 107, at 161-62 (concluding that DOPA is likely unconstitutional).
116. See Iven & Chen, supra note 3, at Al; Ho, supra note 3, at 3; Barnard, supra note
3, at 11; Cattabiani, supra note 3, at Al.
117. See NYC Considers Predator Ban On Networking Sites, Feb. 13, 2008,
ExtremeTech.com, available at http://www.westlaw.com (Business & News; search using
title) [hereinafter Predator Ban]; Panel passes sexual predator bill: Legislation cracks down
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In New York, prosecutors and district attorneys are supporting
state Attorney General Andrew Cuomo's proposed Electronic
Security and Targeting of Online Predators "8  ("e-STOP")
legislation. "9 e-STOP, as a condition of parole, would require sex
offenders who: target children, have used the Internet in the past to
commit sex crimes, and those with the highest risk level 20 to register
their screen and login names for email, instant messaging, and other
forms of communication via the Internet. 2' The proposed law would
prohibit the specified types of sex offenders from using social
networking sites and "would allow the Division of Criminal Justice
Services to release offenders' information to networking sites ... to
help private companies prevent offenders from joining.',
22
Both Kentucky 23 and Indiana 124 have pending bills that make
using social networking sites by registered sex offenders a Class D
felony, which would be increased to a Class C felony for subsequent
violations. Both bills also require sex offenders to register current:
login/user identities, instant messaging screen names, and email
addresses.29 While these laws are a step in the right direction, the
difficulties of enforcing such laws and the relative ease with which a
tech-savvy sexual predator can register for new online identities and
use Internet protocol ("IP") proxies126 to hide their identity, reduces
the likelihood of substantial gains in making social networking sites
safer for children.
IV.Why Social Networks Should Self-Regulate
The problems with regulating social networks and holding them
liable for the actions and words of their users as previously outlined in
on online activities, Messenger-Inquirer (Owensboro, KY), Feb. 14, 2008 [hereinafter
Panel].
118. A.B. 9859, 231st Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2008); S.B. 6875, 231st Ann. Legis. Sess.
(N.Y. 2008).
119. Predator Ban, supra note 111; Proposal To Ban Sex Offenders From Social
Networking Sites Gains Support, Feb. 14, 2008, CommwebNews.com, available at
http://www.westlaw.com (Business & News; search using title) [hereinafter Proposal].
120. Proposal, supra note 113 (explaining that a level 3 designation is the highest risk
level in New York sex offender categorization).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. H.R. 367, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
124. H.R. 1134, 115th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
125. Ind. H.B. 1134; Ky. H.B. 367.
126. Bradley Mitchell, Can You Hide Your Public IP Address?, About.com: Wireless /
Networking, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/workingwithipaddresses/f/
hideipaddress.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2008).
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this article and other law review articles, have led some authors to
conclude that "Operators of social networking sites and other sites
can, for the time being, take comfort that the CDA provides
immunity from liability for content posted by their users."'27 Other
authors concur, stating that based on "well-established statutory,
common law, and constitutional principles" social networks are
immune from liability."2 Those authors advise social networking sites
to self-regulate in order to forestall litigation.129 While it may be true
that taking proactive measures will reduce the incidence of litigation,
social networks have a much more compelling interest in self-
regulation.
Since most social networking sites do not charge their users for
their service, they finance their operations by selling advertising
space.O The bargaining power of social networking sites vis-A-vis
advertisers is directly related to the number of users using the
website. Social networks with more users can command higher prices
for advertising space. Stated colloquially, it's all about the number of
eyeballs on the page. Furthermore, social networks can help
advertisers target their audience with more precision than other
forums, based on the information that users provide about
themselves.'
The desire to increase the number of users in order to maximize
revenue is in tension with the ability of social networks to provide
adequate security to a rapidly growing user base. For example, prior
to September 26, 2006, to become a member of Facebook users
needed to sign up using a supported ".edu," ".com," org, gov," or
".mil" email address.'32 In essence, this restricted access to people with
certain higher education, business, government, and military email
addresses. While this method of registration was restrictive, it created
a built-in "age verification" system because most minors are ineligible
for the supported types of email addresses. However, in order to
127. Christ, supra note 44, at 16.
128. Marin, supra note 54, at 8.
129. Christ, supra note 44, at 16.
130. MySpace, Advertise with us!, http://www.myspace.com/modules/common/pages/
sales.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2008); Facebook, Facebook Ads,
http://www.facebook.com/ads/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
131. Facebook, Press Release, Facebook Unveils Facebook Ads, Nov. 6, 2007,
available at http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=9176 ("Facebook Ads, an ad
system for businesses to connect with users and target advertising to the exact audiences
they want").
132. Facebook, Press Release, Facebook Expansion Enables More People to Connect
with Friends in a Trusted Environment, Sept. 26, 2006, available at
http:llwww.facebook.com/presslreleases.php?p=618.
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expand its user base, Facebook decided to allow anyone, age 13 or
older, with a valid email address to register and create a profile.
13
Currently, almost two million new users register for Facebook per
week.'3
Social networking sites that do not provide their users with
protections from violations of the terms of service, including sexual
predation, will likely suffer from user discontent, media scrutiny, and
user defection to other sites. A relatively small but critical mass of
defecting users can cause more wide scale defections because of the
viral nature of social networks; users go to the websites that their
friends use.'35 Only websites that remain responsive to their users'
desires will be able to retain them.1
36
A. Self-Regulation as a Process
Having answered the question of why social networks should
regulate themselves, the more difficult question is: What regulations
and methods should these sites employ to protect their users?
Although it may be a truism, it is important to remember that self-
regulation is a process, not a onetime fix. Given the dynamic nature
of the Internet it is not sufficient to sit on the laurels of past solutions.
Technical solutions to: (1) identifying and removing content and users
who violate the Terms of Service agreements, (2) age verification, and
(3) registration systems, will undoubtedly become realities.37 But for
every technical solution created, motivated people will be able to
circumvent that protective measure. This does not mean that social
networks should throw in the towel and stop coming up with creative
solutions to issues of privacy and security. It means that social
networks should implement those solutions and continue to refine
133. See id.; Facebook Terms of Use, supra note 5.
134. Jason Sobel, Keeping Up, THE FACEBOOK BLOG, Dec. 21, 2007,
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=7899307130, (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
135. An example of this type of behavior was seen with the users of Friendster.com.
Friendster was one of the earliest social networks to get traction but users seem to have
abandoned the site in favor of MySpace and Facebook. While Friendster should have a
larger base because of its age, it is no longer as popular as it once was.
136. For example, the institution of Beacon, a Facebook feature designed to share
with friends what online purchases a user has made on other websites, created a firestorm
of complaints by users about invasion of privacy. Mark Zuckerberg, creator of Facebook,
wrote an article on The Facebook Blog which apologized to users and announced an opt-
in modification to Beacon. That article succeeded in calming user complaints. See Mark
Zuckerberg, Thoughts on Beacon, THE FACEBOOK BLOG, Dec. 5, 2007,
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=7584397130 (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
137. Spector, supra note 6, at 1B (Facebook spokeswoman, Brandee Barker stating
"We... are constantly working on processes and technologies that will further improve
safety and user control on the site").
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them in order to reduce the incidence of online sexual solicitation,
harassment, and cyber-bullying.
B. Better Practices
It is impossible to know what the 'best practices' are for social
networks given how rapidly the Internet changes. However, the
following non-comprehensive list provides some idea of better
practices that social networks can institute which would increase
security and safety. Because the security measures vary so widely
from one social networking site to another, some of the suggestions
listed below may already be implemented on various websites.
Social networking sites should:
- Create and require users to view an introductory video on
social networking safety and privacy."'
- Create enhanced and particularized privacy controls which
would allow users to control what aspects of their profile they wish to
share with certain types of users. '
- Create a separate sub-network for minors, which is
automatically more restrictive in privacy settings and requires
verification (like providing first and last name of the other user) '0
before allowing users of majority age to be added as friends.
- Change profile creation/modification forms so they do not ask
users to post personally identifiable information like phone numbers
and home addresses.141
- Filter and block users from posting personally identifying
information, especially phone numbers, in public areas like the
comment section on another user's profile where the user is unable to
control who may see the information they have posted.
- Create a notification mechanism for users to report harassment,
solicitation, sexually explicit and obscene materials, and other Terms
of Service violations with the click of a button.
- Respond to and begin investigating complaints of cyber-
stalking, harassment, or sexual solicitation within twenty-four hours.
138. For a good example of such a video see Bebo Safety, http://bebo.com/Safety.jsp
(last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
139. Facebook provides a good example of such privacy controls. See Privacy
Overview, http://www.facebook.com/privacy/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
140. The purpose behind such safety measures would be to ensure that the two users
actually know each other in the real world.
141. While this suggestion may not prevent users from posting such information in
other sections of their profile, not providing a specific location will decrease the number of
users who post such information which may be used against them by sexual predators.
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- Cross check users with updated registered sexual offender lists
on a regular schedule and remove those users.
- Foster community policing. Users, if given appropriate
mechanisms, are capable of reporting unwanted and inappropriate
behaviors.
V. Conclusion
Direct legal regulation of social networking websites to protect
users, especially minors, from sexual predators, sexually explicit
material, and other unwanted behaviors is difficult because such
regulation will face First Amendment freedom of speech issues.
However, it is in the interest of social networks to self-regulate in
order to avoid litigation and to maintain their user base. Social
network self-regulation is not a panacea; parents must do their part
by protecting and educating their children about the dangers of the
Internet.'42 Users of social networking sites, parents, the media, and
governmental bodies should continue to demand, encourage, and
foster self-regulation by social networking sites.
142. See Gehman, supra note 104, at 183 (concluding "parents must take more
responsibility for their children's activities on the Internet"); Editorial, Social networks
take first steps to protect kids, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 17, 2008 ("There is no
substitute for strong parental supervision of kids on the Internet"); Larry King, My not so
safe space, still? Experts say new pact won't faze predators, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Feb. 10, 2008, at Al ("'Parents,.... are the best monitoring program we know of'").
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